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The legal idea of the state is commonly misunderstood. In this note, the nature of the 
concept is explained and its significance for modern legal thought presented. 
Drawing on the distinction between sovereign and sovereignty, it is argued that the 
state—an idea that links territory, authority and people in an intelligible scheme—is 
the foundational concept that enable lawyers coherently to engage with the issue of 
political authority. 
 
Does the concept of the state serve any useful purpose? Many jurists think not, but 
this belief, I contend, is founded on a misunderstanding of the concept. The skeptical 
response is most strongly expressed by those immersed in a common law tradition 
that distrusts abstraction: as Maitland once said, we prefer our persons to be real. 
Common lawyers recognize that governing institutions exist, that they are equipped 
with general powers to act, and that practices have evolved to keep these institutions 
within the bounds of their jurisdictional competences. Nothing more is required to 
understand the constitution of the state, they suggest, though here the latter term 
signifies only the territorial boundary within which governing institutions can exercise 
their powers. Some extend this claim and argue that the state is merely an obfuscating 
metaphysical abstraction which prevents us from seeing how governing power is 
actually exercised.1 The state, they might even say, is a continental European 
invention devised to justify authoritarian regimes.2 
 While there once may have been merit in such claims, they are no longer 
convincing. The common law approach to the question of political authority can no 
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longer be sustained. The signs were there over a century ago when the growth of 
government had caused Maitland to explain that we cannot get by without a concept 
of the state.3 But over the last 50 years, as the judiciary has been forced by the 
pressure of political circumstances incrementally to fashion a more formal account of 
the public law of the British state, the difficulties caused by the lack of a concept of 
the state has been evident for all prepared to look.4  
Common lawyers had been able to sidestep this concept by the simple 
expedient of avoiding some basic questions about governmental authority: what 
source? in whose hands? under what conditions? subject to what limits? In doing so, 
they left a great void at the core.5 An informal accommodation might have worked in 
Victorian Britain when the existence of legal and political authority went more or less 
unquestioned, but these conditions no longer prevail. Today, questions previously 
treated as non-justiciable because they touched on “affairs of State” are now being 
presented in terms that demand answers, and lawyers, caught up in myths of their own 
devising, are no longer able to hide behind evasive rules and practices. And, as 
Maitland again explains, this concept of the state cannot be circumvented by using 
terms like “polity” or “regime”: for our purposes, these are distinctions without a 
difference. Whatever term is used, the point at issue is whether a concept that 
represents the general and permanent arrangement of authority of a collective 
association is needed.  
 In continental Europe, by contrast, many public lawyers raised on the central 
importance of the state now argue that the concept has had its day. They claim that the 
changes now taking place in the activity of governing—from the growing use of 
public–-private partnerships to the increasing influence of transnational or 
supranational institutions—have had the effect of rendering the concept anachronistic. 
                                                
3 F. W. Maitland, The Crown as Corporation, in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS , 244 (H. A. L. 
Fisher ed., 1911),: “We cannot get on without the State, or the Nation, or the 
Commonwealth, or the Public, and yet that is what we are professing to do.” Id. at 253. 
4 For illustrations, see Martin Loughlin, The State, the Crown and the Law, in  THE 
NATURE OF THE CROWN: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 33 (Maurice Sunkin & 
Sebastian Payne eds., 1999); JANET MCLEAN, SEARCHING FOR THE STATE IN BRITISH 
LEGAL THOUGHT (2012). 
5 See F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (H. A. L. Fisher 
ed., 1908): The Crown is “a convenient cover for ignorance,” one which “saves us from 
asking difficult questions.” Id. at 418. See further JOSEPH M. JACOB, THE REPUBLICAN 
CROWN: LAWYERS AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY BRITAIN 
(1996). 
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But in this respect, I argue, that claim rests on a restricted conception of the idea of 
the state, one drawn from a legal positivist philosophy which seeks to recast the state 
as a special category of legal person. 
The argument I want to make about the foundational significance of the 
juristic concept of the state is a general one that applies to both groups. It requires me 
to offer a precise explanation of the juristic meaning of the state. But I propose to 
approach it obliquely, by first examining the concept of sovereignty. The justification 
is that sovereignty is taken to be a characteristic feature of a state, and it is only by 
first exposing the errors in the treatment of that concept that I can highlight the 




There is considerable confusion among those who write on sovereignty,6 and 
revealing the source of that confusion exposes the key distinction that lies at the core 
of my argument. This is between sovereign and sovereignty, that is, between its 
concrete and abstract meanings.  
Carl Schmitt’s book, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Doctrine of 
Sovereignty vividly illustrates this point. This is a profound work but, notwithstanding 
its title, it examines only a concrete thing, “the sovereign,” and fails to deal with that 
abstract thing, “sovereignty.” This is evident from the outset. Chapter 1 immediately 
gives us a definition of the sovereign: “Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception.”7 And the rest of the chapter examines the characteristics of the sovereign. 
But perhaps sovereignty will be more explicitly addressed in Chapter 2,  “The 
Problem of Sovereignty as the Problem of Legal Form and Decision”? This chapter 
must surely offer a definition. Here Schmitt’s intent is most explicitly revealed. “Of 
all juristic concepts,” he asserts, “the concept of sovereignty is the one most governed 
by actual interests.”8 He then explains that the “conceptual development” of 
                                                
6 See Martin Loughlin, Why Sovereignty? in SOVEREIGNTY AND LAW: DOMESTIC, 
REGIONAL & GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 34 (Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland, & Alison 
Young eds), 2013). 
7 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., University of Chicago Press, 2005) (1922) 
(page references are to the 2005 edition). 
8 Id. at 16. 
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sovereignty must be characterized not by a “dialectical heightening inherent in the 
characteristics of the concept” but “by various political power struggles.”9 Having 
reduced the abstract concept to the concrete form, he is able finally to offer a 
definition: “Sovereignty is the highest, legally independent, underived power.”10 
There we have it: sovereignty is an expression of the power exercised by the 
sovereign. The abstract collapses into the concrete.  
This gives us a precise meaning of the term, but it is not one that seems at all 
adequate. The historic source of the term “sovereignty” is certainly found in the figure 
of the sovereign, but Schmitt too readily glosses over its subsequent dialectical 
development. I should briefly consider that development.  
The term “sovereign” was coined to denote the office of the ruler. It signified 
the authority of that office, in that (as Schmitt states) a sovereign ruler was not legally 
obligated to any other power. As Bodin and Hobbes had suggested, the ruler’s 
sovereignty signified the absolute quality of the legal relationship between ruler and 
subject. But even in the early-modern period it was recognized that the ruler occupied 
a representative office: whatever deference might be paid to the king’s majesty, the 
ruler did not exercise a personal power. This recognition came about in a circuitous 
manner, in that first the monarchical image of the sovereign ruler was idealized (“the 
king can do no wrong”) and this then opened the way for an institutionalization of 
“the king’s will.” Once the king’s will was institutionalized, the sovereign could be 
conceived as a corporate office. Through internal differentiation, the sovereign 
powers of government—what Bodin called the “marks of sovereignty”—no longer 
inhered in the person of the ruler: they came to be exercised variously through the 
king-in-parliament, the king-in-council, the king’s ministers, and the king’s courts.  
This principle is clearly understood in British practice, where the doctrine that 
the “king-in-parliament is sovereign” still holds sway. But such institutionalization 
was also a feature of the so-called absolutist regimes of continental Europe. Whatever 
uncertainties surround the concept, sovereignty surely expresses the absolute legal 
authority of the ruling power in its corporate capacity. 
That, however, is only the first stage of its dialectical development. These 
processes of institutionalization, internal differentiation and corporatization of the 
office of the sovereign permitted—indeed required—a distinction to be drawn 
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between the sovereign powers of rule and the concept of sovereignty itself. 
Specifically, the powers of rule could be divided, but sovereignty—expressing the 
absolute authority of the ruling power—could not. This point had indeed already been 
understood at its moment of conception. Schmitt claimed that Bodin was the first to 
identify the sovereign as an entity able to determine the exception.11 But he did not 
mention that Bodin also was the first to appreciate that a distinction must be made 
between sovereignty and the sovereign powers of government. 
This distinction between sovereignty and government becomes especially 
important once we follow through Schmitt’s argument. In Chapter 3 he declares that 
“all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts.”12 We can appreciate the point, but once it is accepted that sovereign right is 
not bestowed from above by God but is conferred from below by “the people,” then 
the dynamic changes. It becomes complicated because, despite some of the claims 
made for popular sovereignty, the fact is that the people exist qua people only once 
the sovereign office of government has been established. Hobbes had seen this, but it 
was Rousseau who most explicitly highlighted its paradoxical nature.13 This type of 
claim cannot be vindicated as a matter of historical fact: it can only be established 
retrospectively, once a regime has been established. The statement that “the people is 
sovereign” is therefore one of considerable ambiguity. Any attempt to specify the 
sovereign of Schmitt’s definition - that person or body that possesses “the highest, 
legally independent, underived power” - must in the modern world remain an 
uncertain undertaking. But uncertainty over identification of the sovereign does not 
suggest uncertainty about sovereignty. 
This is most clearly explained in the work of the early-modern social contract 
theorists. Their way out of the paradox Rousseau had highlighted was to change the 
basis of the argument. They reworked the question of the origin of ultimate authority 
from a historical inquiry into a thought experiment. The source of authority is 
conceived not as a historical event but as a virtual act. This act—the political pact 
(otherwise, the social contract)—is treated as a symbolic expression (a retrospective 
                                                
11 Id. at 8–9. 
12 Id. at 36. 
13 THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 137 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne 
trans., Cambridge University Press, 1998) (1647); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 71 
(Victor Gourevitch ed. Cambridge University Press, 1997) (1762). 
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reconstruction) of the passage from natural to civil existence. And once the virtual 
character of this transition is acknowledged, it becomes clear that, other than in a 
purely representational sense, power is not delegated from the people (the multitude) 
to their governors. Nevertheless, it is only through this type of virtual exercise that the 
imaginative world of the political is created. This world of the political is the world of 
public law, the world in which we imagine ourselves as citizens impressed with rights 
and responsibilities within the collective association through which we are governed. 
Once this point is grasped, it is strained to say that the “people is sovereign”: 
any governmental regime must take some constitutional form and it is unlikely that 
any constituted body would possess “legally independent, underived power.” But 
although the office of sovereign is an ambiguous one, the concept of sovereignty is 
not. Sovereignty comes into its own as a representation of the power and authority 
created through the formation of that political worldview (Weltanschauung). 
Sovereignty is vested neither in the ruler nor in the office of government nor in the 
people: sovereignty vests in the set of relations created through the establishment of 
these practices. The trajectory of development of the idea of absolute authority thus 
moves from sovereign ruler through the corporatization of the office to a sense of 
sovereignty that is conceptually different from the actual institutional arrangements of 
government. Sovereignty now presents itself as a representation of the autonomy of 
the political domain; it is an expression of the absolute authority of that political 
worldview.  
 
2. The State 
 
I now come to the concept of the state. The German tradition of Staatslehre posits 
three fundamental elements of the state: territory, ruling authority, and people. The 
first refers to the existence of the state as an independent territory; the second to the 
institutional apparatus of rule that secures sovereign authority internally and 
externally; and the third connotes the idea of the state as an aggregation of members 
of the association—subjects/citizens—within that territory. The first aspect 
(Staatsgebiet) indicates the way that states as independent entities engage with one 
another in the world and provides the basis for creating a body of public international 
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law.14 In this sense, the entire world is divided into an arrangement of bounded 
territories, or states. The latter two aspects are of greater relevance to the task of 
specifying the character of public law. They indicate that the state is both a governing 
arrangement (Staatsgewalt) and an associational entity (Staatsvolk). From the 
perspective of Staatsgewalt, the state might be conceived as operating in a Hobbesian 
(or Schmittian) sovereign–subject relationship, but from that of Staatsvolk subjects 
are citizens who comprise the membership of the state and, ultimately, are the source 
of political power. This German formulation has been widely adopted in European 
jurisprudence.  
My argument is that the way the concept has evolved parallels the distinctions I 
have drawn between sovereign and sovereignty. In the early nineteenth century, 
Staatslehre had been conceived as a broad field, the objective of which was to 
generate a general science of the state that drew on, and sought to integrate, political 
theory, sociology, and law. But in the latter half of that century, and under the 
influence of legal positivism, the concept of the state was reformulated. The 
Gerber/Laband school, soon to become dominant, advocated the establishment of a 
more precise notion of Staatsrechtswissenschaft (science of state law) which removed 
all “extraneous” matters from consideration. These extraneous matters included 
history, politics, and ideas drawn from private law. In so doing, these jurists were able 
to devise a new specification: the state, they claimed, is a legal entity possessed of a 
special type of corporate personality produced by the operation of public law. The 
state is a legal person. 
In this specification, the state is a legal person that possesses a will, and this 
will is what we mean by law. “The power of the state to will,” wrote Gerber, “the 
ruling power, is the law of the state.”15 Gerber created a legal personality for the state 
essentially by confining the concept of the state to that of Staatsgewalt. By virtue of 
this maneuver, he equated the state to that of the sovereign. This shift is reinforced by 
the tendency in German political thought to draw a distinction between state and 
society: the state, it is assumed, is an institutional apparatus that disciplines and 
regulates social forces and maintains (political) unity from (social) diversity. In some 
respects, this is a peculiarity of the German process of state development. 
                                                
14 See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Liberty Fund, 2008) (1797). 
15 CARL FRIEDRICH VON GERBER, GRUNDZÜGE EINES SYSTEMS DES DEUTSCHEN 
STAATSRECHTS 3 (1865). 
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Nevertheless, this positivist conception of the state as a legal person has been adopted 
by many jurists, a practice bolstered by its widespread adoption, in the twentieth 
century, of the emerging (positivist) political science. 
This, I suggest, yields an impoverished account of the juristic concept of the 
state. The concept of the state cannot simply be reduced to one of its three aspects: to 
do so undermines the role that it performs as a constitutive foundation of modern public 
law. If the concept is assumed to express the institutional apparatus of rule, then the 
state is equated to the office of government. Yet Bodin had clearly recognized that 
sovereignty must be distinguished from government, and so too—if it is to be able do 
its job—must the concept of the state be distinguished from the office of government. 
The state is not simply a synonym for government: it is “an abstract entity above and 
distinct from both government and governed.”16 As an abstract term encompassing its 
three aspects—territory, ruling power, and people—the state is the correlative 
expression of sovereignty.17  
Like sovereignty, the state stands as a representation of the autonomy of a 
political worldview: the state expresses the main elements of that worldview 
(territory, people, and institutional apparatus) and sovereignty symbolizes its absolute 
authority. The concept of the state therefore performs an ontological function: it is 
that which must be presupposed in order to give access to modern political reality. It 
is a juristic concept that enables us not only to make sense of a political world that has 
been created through a collective act of imagination but also to express this coherently 
as a law-governed world.  
State and sovereignty are juristic concepts. The sovereign character of the state 
means that it generates its own source of law: the state is “the fons et origio of all 
those laws which condition its own actions and determine the legal relations of those 
subject to its authority.”18 In his landmark work on the foundations of modern 
                                                
16 J. H. SHENNAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN EUROPEAN STATE 1450-1725, 114 
(1974). 
17 See ADHEMAR ESMEIN, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL FRANÇAIS ET 
COMPARE (7th ed., 1921): “The self-foundation of public law consists in giving to 
sovereignty, apart from and beyond the persons who exercise it at any given moment, 
an ideal and permanent subject or title, which personifies the entire nation: this entity 
is the state, which herewith is identical to sovereignty, the latter being its essential 
attribute.” Id. at 1. 
18 WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW 30 
(1924). 
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political thought, Quentin Skinner claimed that modernity is realized with the 
emergence of the idea of the state as “an entity which is at once distinct from both 
rulers and ruled,”19 and he suggested that the state becomes the “master noun” of 
modern political argument.20 The basic argument is sound but the choice of metaphor 
is not. Referring to the state as the master noun of public law once again reduces the 
state to the office of rule. If its juridical significance is to be grasped, it must be 
conceived as the foundational concept from which the grammar, vocabulary, and 
syntax of “political right” (i.e. public law) is derived. The concept of the state yields 
the basic scheme of intelligibility through which we are able to conceive the political 
world as a set of legal relations.  
 The state, then, is that which is presupposed to enable us to create a world 
comprising citizens and subjects who are bearers of rights and duties and who exist in 
a set of relations with a matrix of institutions that shape the world of the political. The 
state constitutes “a certain way of thinking, reasoning, and calculating”21 and gives us 
access to a political world of institutions and practices formed as an autonomous set 
of politicolegal relations. If we think of institutions in the way that Hauriou and 
Romano envisaged them, we might say that the state is the “institution of 
institutions.”22 The contours of this scheme are without doubt the subject of 
continuous contestation. But the essential point is that this process of argumentation 





Contrary to the claims of those who maintain that it serves no useful purpose or is an 
obfuscating metaphysical abstraction, the state is the foundational concept that 
                                                
19 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 112 
(1978). 
20 Quentin Skinner, The State, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 
90, 123 (Terence Ball, James Farr, & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1989). 
21 MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE 
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1977-78, 286 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 
2007). 
22 Maurice Hauriou, The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in 
Social Vitalism, in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS: MAURICE HAURIOU, GEORGES 
RENARD, JOSEPH T. DELOS 93 (Albert Broderick ed., 1970); SANTI ROMANO, THE 
LEGAL ORDER (Mariano Croce trans., Routledge, 2017) (1918). 
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enables lawyers coherently to engage with questions of political authority. Jurists who 
claim that we have now moved beyond the state are invariably deceiving themselves. 
Their arguments make sense only if by the state they mean the institutional apparatus 
of rule. That, as I have argued, is a distortion: it equates the state to the government 
and it rests on a set of dubious assumptions drawn from a legal positivist philosophy.  
This is not an argument against the plurality of legal orders: we can readily 
recognize that a multiplicity of institutions is created through normative schemes to 
which many would attach the label “law.” Rather, it is an argument about authority. In 
the modern world, the law of the state performs the integrative function of 
maintaining political unity and if that function is undermined by fragmentation and 
continuing institutional differentiation, then the consequences for both legal and 
political ordering are serious. Some contend that this in fact expresses the present 
state of affairs. If so, then my claim about the foundational role of the state at least has 
the virtue of specifying the source of our present uncertainties. But others argue that 
this claim about the state is founded on a set of modern factors which no longer 
pertain and that, just as that scheme of intelligibility was able to draw its imaginative 
power from the emergence of a modern system of nation states, then so too can we 
devise a new juridical scheme drawing on contemporary post-modern conditions. This 
may indeed be the case. The difficulty is that no one has yet managed to sketch an 
alternative to match the sophistication and sheer imaginative power of the modern 
state-founded discourse. My argument therefore stands mainly as a warning against 
those who would promote a new juridical world order based on skewed and simplistic 
arguments about the modern scheme’s limitations. 
 
 
